The question of whether the Perikatan Nasional coalition can unilaterally expel Bersatu has taken on fresh significance following comments from Marzuki Mohamad, a former aide to coalition chairman Muhyiddin Yassin. Marzuki's intervention suggests that any attempt to remove the party would face substantial legal and procedural obstacles rooted in the bloc's founding constitutional framework, a development that carries implications for coalition stability in Malaysian politics.
Marzuki's core argument centres on the structural design of PN's governing rules. According to his interpretation, the coalition's constitution mandates that any disciplinary measures or decisions affecting member parties—including those concerning parliamentary representation and organisational status—must secure the backing of every member of the presidential council. This unanimity requirement represents a significant departure from decision-making structures that rely on simple or majority voting thresholds, creating what amounts to a veto mechanism for any constituent party.
The significance of this constitutional provision becomes apparent when examined against the backdrop of recent political tensions within the coalition. Bersatu, which emerged as a breakaway faction from the United Malays National Organisation under Muhyiddin's leadership, has become a focal point of internal coalition dynamics. The party's position as a co-founder of the bloc means its members would likely include representatives on the presidential council, effectively granting the party itself a voice in any disciplinary proceedings that might affect its status.
This structural arrangement reflects the delicate balance struck when PN was first formalised. The coalition brought together parties with distinct organisational cultures and political trajectories: the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), which carries decades of ideological consistency; Bersatu, built primarily around Muhyiddin's political network; and smaller allied components. The emphasis on consensus-based decision-making at the presidential council level appears designed to prevent any dominant member from unilaterally reshaping the coalition's composition without broad agreement.
For Malaysian political observers and stakeholders in coalition governance, Marzuki's analysis points toward a fundamental constraint on coalition leadership flexibility. In systems where disciplinary decisions require unanimous approval, dissident or problematic members effectively possess leverage that extends beyond their numerical strength. A single member of the presidential council can block proposed action, regardless of broader sentiment within the wider coalition or even among the general membership.
The practical implications of this unanimity requirement are substantial. Should other coalition components wish to discipline Bersatu or seek to modify its role within PN—whether regarding parliamentary seat allocation, ministerial portfolios, or formal membership status—they would need to secure agreement from Bersatu's own council representatives. This creates a negotiating dynamic fundamentally different from hierarchical or majority-rule systems, where dissent by a minority can be overridden through democratic voting procedures.
Marzuki's intervention also illuminates the distinction between administrative mechanisms within the coalition and external political pressure. While PN's leadership might face mounting pressure from grassroots members, allied parties, or the broader political environment to take action against Bersatu, the constitutional framework presents what amounts to an internal veto that cannot be bypassed through political will alone. This constitutional rigidity has become increasingly relevant given ongoing discussions about coalition cohesion and the role of various member parties.
Regionally, this constitutional arrangement reflects patterns seen in other multiparty coalitions across Southeast Asia, where founding documents often attempt to balance the creation of unified political blocs with protections for constituent parties' autonomy. The PN model, with its emphasis on presidential council consensus, represents a particular approach to managing coalition tensions that prioritises stability through rule-based constraints rather than hierarchical authority.
For Malaysian readers, understanding these procedural realities is essential for interpreting future developments in coalition politics. Statements from coalition leadership or media reports suggesting potential expulsion or disciplinary action against Bersatu cannot be assessed purely on political grounds; they must also be weighed against the institutional constraints embedded in the coalition's constitutional document. This distinction between political rhetoric and constitutional reality often determines the actual trajectory of intraparty or intracoalition disputes.
The emphasis Marzuki places on unanimous approval requirements also raises questions about amendment procedures within PN's constitution. Should coalition members wish to modify the disciplinary framework to enable majority-based decision-making, they would presumably face their own procedural hurdles. The very constitutional feature designed to protect member parties against arbitrary action also makes it difficult to reform the system itself without broad consensus.
As Malaysian politics continues to navigate the complexities of coalition governance, particularly given the multiple political realignments and shifting alliances of recent years, the constitutional foundations of PN merit sustained attention. Marzuki's reminder that institutional rules carry weight independent of political pressure serves as a useful corrective to analyses that focus exclusively on individual personalities or short-term tactical considerations. The formal architecture of political institutions, though less dramatic than leadership struggles, often determines the practical boundaries within which political actors can operate.
