Germany has emerged as Europe's most hawkish nation on China, a striking reversal that reflects mounting economic hardship and growing public anxiety about Beijing's market dominance. According to polling conducted across 13 European countries, 49 per cent of Germans regard China as either a rival or adversary—a proportion substantially higher than any other nation surveyed, including France at 43 per cent. This shift in public opinion comes amid an intense policy debate in Berlin, where government officials are wrestling with whether to abandon decades of pragmatic engagement in favour of more assertive trade measures.
The underlying cause of this reorientation is brutally concrete. Germany's manufacturing sector has contracted sharply, shedding approximately 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025, with the haemorrhage continuing at a rate of 10,000 positions each month, according to analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations. The automotive industry, the cornerstone of Germany's industrial prowess and export economy, faces particular stress. Chinese manufacturers have steadily encroached on both domestic German markets and export territories where German brands once held commanding positions. This competitive displacement has transformed China from a distant concern into an immediate economic threat affecting factory floors, supply chains, and regional employment.
Yet public anxiety has not automatically translated into government action. Berlin has been reluctant to embrace restrictive measures, most notably abstaining from endorsing new anti-subsidy duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles when the bloc voted in 2024. This hesitation partly reflects internal government divisions, particularly within Chancellor Friedrich Merz's coalition administration. Economy Minister Katherina Reiche, herself a member of Merz's Christian Democratic Union, has proven notably resistant to aggressive steps against what analysts term a "China shock 2.0." Her reluctance represents the residual force of Germany's traditional business-friendly, export-oriented economic philosophy.
Yet the polling data suggests the political cost of inaction may be rising. Supporters of both the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats overwhelmingly oppose Beijing's current trajectory, with 60 per cent of adherents in each party viewing China as an adversary or rival. This convergence around tougher stances spans the mainstream German political spectrum, indicating broad electoral permission for policy shifts that would have been politically contentious merely a few years ago. The survey indicates that Berlin need not fear voter backlash should it pursue more muscular trade defences, fundamentally altering the political calculus that has long privileged restraint.
A notable exception within German politics is the far-right Alternative for Germany, which has gained ground in recent polling and is projected to perform strongly in some regional elections this year. The AfD takes a markedly different view, with 45 per cent of its supporters regarding China as a "necessary partner" and another 5 per cent calling it an ally. This positioning isolates the AfD from mainstream opinion, even as it claims to represent disaffected voters. Similarly, the Left party has adopted a cooperative stance toward Beijing, though its parliamentary representation remains marginal. These outlier positions hint at the ideological divide underlying German China strategy: populist and ideological parties tend toward either accommodation or confrontation based on anti-Western positioning, while mainstream parties increasingly focus on protecting economic interests.
Surprisingly, the centre-left Social Democrats have emerged as the most assertive mainstream force on China policy. Within this traditionally moderate bloc, 60 per cent regard Beijing as either a rival or adversary, positioning them ahead of other major parties in adopting hardline rhetoric. This represents a departure from European social democratic traditions, which have tended toward diplomatic engagement and soft power approaches. The shift suggests that economic grievances are overriding ideological preferences and cross-border party alliances, replacing them with a focus on tangible domestic industrial concerns.
A pivotal moment arrived recently when the chief executive of Volkswagen, Germany's most iconic carmaker and a global symbol of German manufacturing excellence, publicly called for European tariffs on Chinese plug-in hybrid vehicles. This reversal of position carries enormous symbolic weight. Merely months earlier, during the 2024 debate on electric vehicle duties, Volkswagen had vigorously opposed such measures. The company's about-face demonstrates that competitive pressure from Chinese rivals has intensified beyond the tolerance threshold of even Germany's most powerful business leaders. For a Volkswagen executive to advocate for trade defence measures—a position long associated with protectionism and market distortion—signals recognition that the competitive challenge transcends conventional negotiation and requires state intervention.
According to Noah Barkin, a specialist in German-Chinese relations at Rhodium Group, this public appeal from automotive leadership represents unprecedented territory. Barkin notes that the default strategy of Germany's industrial titans for decades has been to lobby Berlin and Brussels for non-intervention, preferring market solutions and negotiated arrangements. That German business elites are now explicitly requesting government protection indicates the severity of the competitive threat. Chinese manufacturers, through subsidised battery production, state-backed financing, and integrated supply chains, have constructed competitive advantages that German firms cannot overcome through conventional market mechanisms. The erosion of German market share is not a temporary cyclical downturn but a structural shift in global automotive power.
This convergence of public opinion, political calculation, and business advocacy creates conditions for policy reassessment in Berlin. Chancellor Merz's government faces mounting pressure to either embrace more interventionist trade measures or risk appearing detached from voters' economic concerns and business community anxieties. The traditional German commitment to open markets and multilateral rule-based systems, while still rhetorically powerful, is colliding with the immediate reality of manufacturing decline and lost competitiveness. Interior calculations within the coalition government, particularly around Economy Minister Reiche's position, will prove decisive in determining whether Germany follows the logic of economic self-interest or adheres to established paradigms.
For Southeast Asian readers and policymakers, Germany's evolving China approach carries significant implications. A tougher German stance would reinforce protectionist momentum within the European Union, potentially reordering trade relationships and supply chain strategies across the region. Companies throughout Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia that depend on European markets or compete with Chinese manufacturers would face different competitive terrain. Additionally, weakening German-Chinese economic interdependence could embolden European institutional action against Beijing across domains from technology to investment screening. The shifts underway in Berlin are not merely internal German policy adjustments but potential harbingers of broader European strategic repositioning that will reshape economic relationships across continents.
