The Sabah state government has reaffirmed its unwillingness to cede immigration authority to federal control, declaring that implementation of the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency Act 2024 cannot be allowed to undermine the constitutional protections granted to the state when Malaysia was formed. Speaking in the State Legislative Assembly in Kota Kinabalu on July 22, Assistant Minister to the Chief Minister Datuk Joniston Bangkuai articulated the administration's resolute position on a matter that strikes at the heart of Sabah's identity within the Malaysian federation.
The controversy centres on how the new federal agency, referred to as AKPS, should operate in Sabah. While acknowledging that the legislation itself falls within federal legislative power, Bangkuai emphasised that the state government has already notified Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim of its non-negotiable demands. Most critically, Sabah insists on maintaining its own State Immigration Department as the body responsible for controlling all entry points to the state, a provision the government views as fundamental to its autonomy.
Equally important to Sabah's stance is the matter of Not-To-Land notices, the administrative tool used to deny entry to individuals deemed undesirable. The state government is adamant that responsibility for issuing these notices should remain exclusively with the Sabah State Immigration Department rather than being transferred to the federal AKPS. This seemingly technical requirement carries profound implications for the state's ability to control its own borders and manage migration according to local circumstances and priorities.
The constitutional foundation for Sabah's position lies in Article V of the Malaysia Agreement 1963, the document that established the terms on which Sabah joined the federation. Unlike peninsular states, Sabah (then Sabah) and Sarawak were granted explicit immigration autonomy as part of the arrangement that created modern Malaysia. Bangkuai was careful to frame the state's demands not as obstruction but as defence of settled constitutional law. The immigration powers granted to Sabah under MA63, he stressed, are non-negotiable and beyond the reach of subsequent federal legislation that might implicitly attempt to whittle them away.
This stance reflects broader anxieties in Sabah about the gradual erosion of special rights that were supposed to be permanent features of the state's status within Malaysia. The Sabah government has positioned itself as custodian of constitutional safeguards that protect not just bureaucratic arrangements but the state's distinctive political identity. Bangkuai warned that allowing encroachment on immigration autonomy could establish a dangerous precedent for other areas where Sabah enjoys special constitutional status.
Chief Minister Datuk Seri Hajiji Noor had already signalled this intransigence in May when he announced that Sabah would postpone implementation of the new Act until federal authorities provided explicit guarantees that the state's special rights and immigration autonomy would remain untouched. Hajiji's framing of the issue was particularly telling: he emphasised that immigration autonomy for Sabah and Sarawak was not merely a bureaucratic privilege but foundational to Malaysia's formation itself. Without these protections, he implied, the entire constitutional bargain that created the federation loses its integrity.
The Malaysian Agreement 1963 was fundamentally a contract between distinct political entities—Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore—each with defined rights and protections. For Sabah, immigration autonomy represented one of the most important safeguards of its distinct interests, allowing the state to control population movements and protect local employment opportunities. Any successful attempt to transfer this power to a federal agency would represent a significant modification of the original constitutional settlement, something Sabah clearly believes should not occur without explicit negotiation and consent.
For Malaysian readers outside Sabah, this dispute may seem arcane, a technical disagreement between state and federal agencies. Yet it reflects deeper questions about federalism in Malaysia and the degree to which constitutional protections negotiated at independence should remain inviolate. The Malaysia Agreement 1963 is not merely legislation but a constitutional compact, and erosion of one state's special rights could invite similar challenges from other quarters. Sarawak, which enjoys identical protections under MA63, has indicated it shares Sabah's concerns, suggesting this is not an isolated provincial grievance but a fundamental constitutional issue.
The implementation of the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency Act 2024 thus becomes a test case for how federal and state governments handle conflicts between expansive federal legislation and historic constitutional limitations on federal power. Sabah's government has signalled that it will not be a passive recipient of federal initiatives that touch on matters explicitly reserved to the state. The question now is whether federal authorities will negotiate a framework that respects these historic arrangements or whether they will attempt to implement the Act uniformly across all states, potentially triggering a constitutional crisis.
From a practical perspective, the dispute also reflects genuine policy concerns. Sabah faces distinct migration pressures different from peninsular states, with unique geography and economic circumstances. The state government argues that local immigration officials understand these conditions better than federal bureaucrats in Kuala Lumpur and should retain decision-making authority. This argument carries weight, particularly regarding decisions about which individuals pose security or economic risks and which sectors should be protected from external labour competition.
The Sabah government's strategy appears designed to resolve the matter through negotiation rather than litigation, with the formal letter to the Prime Minister serving as official notice of Sabah's position. By postponing implementation rather than outright refusing it, the state has avoided confrontation while maintaining leverage. The federal government must now choose between compromising on implementation details or pursuing a course that could trigger a constitutional showdown between Putrajaya and Kota Kinabalu.
